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________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
The seller of a medical device, believing it was shut 
out of the market for it, brought suit on federal antitrust 
grounds against associated health insurance companies.  The 
claim was that they shielded themselves from patient demand 
for the seller’s device by agreeing to deny coverage as “not 
medically necessary” or “investigational,” even while the 
medical community, other insurers, and independent arbiters 
viewed it as befitting the standard of care.  The District Court 
dismissed the claim.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse 
its judgment and remand the case for further consideration. 
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I. Factual Background 
We base our analysis, as we must on review of a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal, on the allegations in the operative 
complaint—here the Third Amended Complaint (for 
convenience, the “Complaint”).  According to it, 
cardiovascular disease and disorders are the leading cause of 
death in the United States.  Plaintiff LifeWatch Services, Inc. 
(“LifeWatch”) is one of the two largest sellers of telemetry 
monitors.  They are one of several types of outpatient cardiac 
monitoring devices used to diagnose and treat arrhythmias, or 
changes in heart rate or rhythm, which may signal or lead to 
more serious medical complications.  An arrhythmia can be 
without noticeable symptoms; hence the patient may not 
know it is occurring. 
Other outpatient cardiac monitors include Holter 
monitors, various forms of event monitors, and insertable 
monitors.  All record the electrical activity of a patient’s heart 
to catch any instance of an arrhythmia.  But they vary in 
price, method of data capture, and mechanism by which the 
data are transmitted to an analyst or physician for diagnosis.  
For example, telemetry monitors are about three times as 
expensive as event monitors.  They record up to 30 days of a 
patient’s cardiac activity and automatically transmit the data 
to an analyst center.  Event monitors, by contrast, record short 
windows of data (in some cases no more than a minute), 
which the patient must then take some action to transmit.  
Many event monitors also require the patient to trigger the 
data capture, creating a risk that asymptomatic arrhythmias go 
undetected.  Insertable monitors, which are surgically 
implanted and less frequently used, are the most expensive; 
they cost eight to ten times more than event monitors.  While 
the Complaint quotes from medical studies that recommend 
only telemetry monitors to treat some patients with certain 
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conditions, in other cases telemetry and other monitors are all 
appropriate treatments. 
LifeWatch brought suit against the Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Association (the “Association”) and five of its member 
insurance plan administrators1 (the “Blue Plans”; together 
with the Association, “Blue Cross”) for violating Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.  It claims the Blue Plans 
have impermissibly conspired with each other and the 
Association to deny coverage of telemetry monitors. 
The Association, which is not an insurer itself, owns 
the rights to the Blue Cross and Blue Shield trademarks and 
trade names.  It licenses the right to the Blue Cross brand to 
36 insurers nationwide.  These Blue Plans are allegedly the 
largest commercial health insurance group in the country, 
collectively insuring 105 million Americans, with a national 
network that covers 96% of hospitals and 92% of doctors.  As 
                                              
1 The Defendant Blue Plans named in the Complaint are: 
Wellpoint, Inc., allegedly an Indiana corporation that, 
combined with its affiliates, serves more than 71 million 
people in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin, or more than 
a third of all privately insured Americans; Horizon Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, allegedly the largest health 
insurer in New Jersey; Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Minnesota, which allegedly has more members, products, and 
services than other insurers in that state; BlueCross 
BlueShield of South Carolina; and Highmark, Inc., allegedly 
one of the largest health insurers in the country serving, with 
affiliates, insureds in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and West 
Virginia.  As described later, LifeWatch has since settled its 
case against Highmark. 
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a group, they are a major purchaser of medical devices and 
services nationwide. 
The Association maintains a model medical policy that 
recommends to the Blue Plans which treatments, devices, or 
services to cover.  Each Blue Plan participates in the 
development of these recommendations by voting on them.  
A panel of some kind—the Complaint is vague—then meets 
several times a year to finalize the model policy.2 
For more than a decade the model policy has 
recommended against covering prescriptions for telemetry 
monitors, explaining that in some cases they are not 
“medically necessary” and in the rest they are 
“investigational.”  This provision of the model policy has 
been adopted in near lockstep3 by the Association’s member 
Blue Plans.  Though the Plans’ language denying coverage is 
not always identical, the reasoning is the same. 
Meanwhile, Medicare, Medicaid, and other private 
insurers, including Aetna, cover telemetry monitor 
                                              
2 LifeWatch’s brief on appeal explains that the “Medical 
Policy Panel” is “the name Defendants give to themselves 
acting in concert.”  Appellant Br. 3.  However, we see no 
basis in the pleadings on which to infer who or what the panel 
comprises. 
 
3 The Complaint references only two Blue Plans that ever 
contracted with LifeWatch to cover telemetry.  One, a Plan in 
Illinois, settled with LifeWatch outside this lawsuit.  As 
described later, the other, Highmark, partially changed course 
and stopped covering telemetry in some cases.  The claims 
against Highmark were dismissed on June 9, 2016, after the 
parties reached a settlement. 
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prescriptions.  Multiple medical studies—the Complaint 
references 10—have reviewed telemetry monitors and found 
them to be effective, superior to other treatments in some 
cases, or medically necessary.  In at least 20 cases brought 
between 2010 and 2012 by patients appealing a denial of 
telemetry monitor coverage, independent, expert review 
boards overturned the insurers’ denials; the review board 
frequently determined that telemetry monitors were a 
standard of care or clinically necessary.  Blue Plans were 
parties to several, if not all, of those appeals. 
Nonetheless, with near uniformity, and for a decade, 
the Blue Plans have declined to cover telemetry monitors.  As 
a result, LifeWatch claims both its sales and cardiac 
monitoring treatment in general have suffered.  It seeks treble 
damages for its losses and an injunction under Sections 4 and 
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26, which 
authorize private plaintiffs to sue for Sherman Act violations. 
II. Analysis 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  
To state a Section 1 claim, then, a plaintiff must allege (1) an 
agreement (2) to restrain trade unreasonably.  In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010).  
A private plaintiff suing under the Clayton Act must also 
allege antitrust standing, including that its “injury [is] of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and . . . flows 
from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”  Id. n.9. 
(quoting (A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 
263 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir.2001)).  Finally, the claim in this 
case could still fail under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 
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U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, which exempts insurance providers 
from federal antitrust liability in certain instances.   
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  Blue Cross moved the 
Court to dismiss LifeWatch’s Sherman Act Section 1 claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
It argued that the Complaint fails to allege either agreement 
or anticompetitive effects in the relevant product market, that 
LifeWatch lacks antitrust standing because it could not show 
antitrust injury, and that Blue Cross’s telemetry monitor 
coverage decisions are immune from antitrust challenge under 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
The District Court dismissed for failing to allege 
anticompetitive effects, and therefore failing to establish the 
restraint was unreasonable.  LifeWatch Servs., Inc. v. 
Highmark, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 641, 648-49 (E.D. Pa. 2017).  
The Court emphasized that, because “each Blue [P]lan treats 
all telemetry providers equally,” LifeWatch failed to allege 
“competition-reducing” conduct.  Id. at 649 (alteration and 
emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It 
concluded that, “even assuming . . . a conspiracy amongst 
Blue Plans to deny coverage for telemetry devices, . . . this 
alleged conspiracy does not violate antitrust laws.”  Id. at 646.  
“[T]he Defendants’ refusal—whether concerted or not—to 
purchase any telemetry device—whether produced by 
LifeWatch or not—is not an antitrust violation, but rather a 
legal exercise of Defendants’ monopsony power.”4  Id. at 
650.  
                                              
4 A monopoly exists if only “one supplier or producer” has 
“control or advantage . . . over the commercial market within 
a given region.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1160 (10th ed. 
2014).  If “one buyer controls the market” instead of a seller, 
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The Court also suggested in a dictum that LifeWatch 
failed to allege an agreement, as it believed the Plans could 
have independently decided “that the benefits of telemetry 
devices do not (yet) outweigh their costs.”  Id. at 649.  It did 
not reach antitrust standing or the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  
Id. at 650. 
LifeWatch timely appealed, and the same four issues 
are now before us for review.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of 
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), “accept[ing] all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and, examining for 
plausibility, ‘determin[ing] whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief.’”  In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (quoting Bronowicz v. Allegheny County, 804 F.3d 
338, 344 (3d Cir. 2015)); see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, 
Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011). 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that LifeWatch 
plausibly stated a claim and has antitrust standing.  However, 
we leave Blue Cross’s McCarran-Ferguson Act argument for 
the District Court’s consideration on remand. 
A. Agreement 
We take in order the elements of a claim under Section 
1.  It prohibits “every contract, combination . . . , or 
conspiracy” that unreasonably restrains trade.  15 U.S.C. § 1.  
We have interpreted these three terms collectively simply to 
mean an agreement.  Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 315.  
                                                                                                     
that is a monopsony.  Id.  Likewise, if “a few large sellers” 
have “control or domination of a market,” it is an oligopoly, 
while oligopsony is where “a few large buyers or customers” 
do.  Id. at 1260. 
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“Unilateral activity by a defendant, no matter the motivation, 
cannot give rise to a [S]ection 1 violation.”  InterVest, Inc. v. 
Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2003).  Instead, 
a plaintiff must plead “some form of concerted action . . . , in 
other words, a unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding or a meeting of minds or a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme . . . .”  Ins. Brokerage, 618 
F.3d at 315 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
An agreement may be shown by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.  W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. 
v. UPMC (“West Penn”), 627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010).  
LifeWatch asserts it has provided allegations of both.  
Because we hold it pled sufficient circumstantial evidence of 
agreement here, we do not reach its direct evidence theory. 
As the Supreme Court explained in detail in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, to survive a motion to dismiss, a 
plaintiff must plead “enough factual matter (taken as true) to 
suggest that an agreement was made.”  550 U.S. 544, 556-57 
(2007).  “[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare 
assertion of conspiracy,” such as “a conclusory allegation of 
agreement at some unidentified point,” will not suffice.  Id.  
Rather, “allegations of parallel conduct . . . must be placed in 
a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, 
not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be 
independent action.”  Id. at 557. 
For circumstantial evidence of an agreement, then, a 
plaintiff must allege both parallel conduct and something 
“more,” which we have sometimes called a “plus factor.”  Ins. 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 321.  This “more” could include 
evidence (1) “that the defendant had a motive to enter into a 
. . . conspiracy,” (2) “that the defendant acted contrary to its 
interests,” or (3) “implying a traditional conspiracy.”  Id. at 
321-22 (quoting In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 
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350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004)).  In cases involving concentrated 
markets like oligopolies or oligopsonies—where a small 
number of sellers or buyers of a particular product dominate 
the market—we have recognized that competitors are more 
likely to be influenced by each other’s behavior even without 
agreeing to act in concert.  For example, “[o]ne oligopolist 
may refrain from lowering its price because it fears, indeed 
knows, that its rivals will match it.”  Phillip E. Areeda & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law 
(“Fundamentals”) § 14.10[G] n.24 (4th ed. Supp. 2017).  In 
those cases we de-emphasize the first two types of evidence, 
which “largely restate [that] phenomenon of 
interdependence,” Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours 
& Co., 873 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Flat Glass, 
385 F.3d at 360), often called “conscious parallelism,” see id.   
We focus instead on the third, id., which is “‘non-economic 
evidence “that there was an actual, manifest agreement . . . ,”’ 
which may include ‘proof that the defendants got together and 
exchanged assurances of common action or otherwise 
adopted a common plan even though no meetings, 
conversations, or exchanged documents are shown,’” Ins. 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 322 (quoting Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 
361). 
LifeWatch pled parallel conduct.  The Complaint 
quotes the provision in the Association’s model policy that 
recommends the Blue Plans deny telemetry monitor coverage.  
It then asserts the Blue Plans adopted the model policy’s 
approach with near total uniformity and references their use 
of similar or identical language to deny coverage of telemetry 
monitors. 
Blue Cross proposes that we end our analysis here 
because the Complaint alleges, at best, no more than parallel 
conduct.  In particular, Blue Cross cites the alleged higher 
price of telemetry monitors relative to event monitors (but 
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lower price relative to insertable monitors) as providing all 
the Plans an independent basis for denying coverage.  Indeed, 
if LifeWatch had alleged only that the Association and the 
Plans reached the same telemetry monitor coverage decisions 
en masse multiple years in a row, and that telemetry monitors 
are more expensive than some other treatment options, Blue 
Cross might have the better argument.  However, LifeWatch 
also pled something “more”: evidence implying a traditional 
conspiracy. 
As an initial matter, the Complaint states that the 
Association’s model policy is set during meetings several 
times a year, where a panel reviews the votes of all Blue 
Plans regarding whether to cover particular treatments.  As 
noted, this model policy, which the Blue Plans participate in 
creating, recommends denying coverage of telemetry 
monitors as either not medically necessary or investigational.  
Blue Cross does not dispute this description of the model 
policy or its creation.  Instead, it argues that its member Plans 
are not bound to follow the model policy; in fact, it explicitly 
disclaims that notion in its text.  Thus, according to Blue 
Cross, the Plans must make wholly independent decisions 
regarding which treatments are medically necessary. 
This argument apparently misunderstands the nature of 
the alleged agreement, which is not contained within the 
model policy’s text.5  LifeWatch claims instead that the Blue 
                                              
5 As we have noted in the criminal conspiracy context, 
“common sense suggests, and experience confirms, that 
illegal agreements are rarely, if ever, reduced to writing or 
verbalized with the precision that is characteristic of a written 
contract.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
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Plans agreed with each other and the Association that they 
would substantially comply with the model policy.  It dubs 
this agreement the “Uniformity Rule.”  The Association then 
allegedly enforces the Plans’ conformance with the model 
policy through audits.  If a Plan strays too far from the model, 
it could face sanctions, including losing the right to use the 
Blue Cross name. 
   Even if these allegations were too conclusory to tip 
the scales in favor of plausibility, the Complaint then 
provides a particular example of the Uniformity Rule’s 
enforcement.  Highmark initially contracted with LifeWatch 
to deem telemetry monitors medically necessary and cover 
prescriptions for them.  Under that contract, Highmark 
covered claims for telemetry monitors submitted both by 
Highmark subscribers and by subscribers to other Blue Plans; 
those Blue Plans would then reimburse Highmark in some 
fashion.  However, allegedly under pressure by the other Blue 
Plans and the Association, it stopped paying for claims from 
non-Highmark subscribers.  As we and other courts have 
observed, “[c]oncerted action is established . . . [by] proof of 
a causal relationship between pressure from one conspirator 
and an anticompetitive decision of another conspirator.”6  
Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir. 
2005); see also Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, 
Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 397-99 (7th Cir. 1989). 
That so many sophisticated third parties allegedly view 
telemetry monitors as medically necessary or meeting the 
standard of care further undercuts Blue Cross’s theory that 
                                              
6 Although LifeWatch’s claim against Highmark has been 
dismissed, it and other unsued Blue Plans remain alleged co-
conspirators to the purported agreement.  Thus their conduct 
can be evidence of the agreement’s existence. 
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nearly three dozen Plans independently made the opposite 
determination for 10 consecutive years.  As noted, according 
to the Complaint, other large insurers, including Aetna as well 
as Medicaid and Medicare, cover telemetry monitors as 
medically necessary.  Multiple medical studies reached 
similar conclusions.  In states that mandate independent, 
expert review of appeals of insurance coverage denials, 
LifeWatch also funded many costly patient appeals of 
telemetry monitor denials.  It allegedly prevailed in an 
overwhelming number of cases; the Complaint identifies 20 
successful appeals between 2010 and 2012 decided by at least 
six different independent review boards.  The Complaint 
indicates that many, if not all, were appeals of a Blue Plan’s 
denial.  The review boards in several cases determined that 
telemetry monitors were clinically necessary or a standard of 
care. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to LifeWatch, see, 
e.g., In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 2015), these allegations 
make an agreement among the Defendants plausible.  While a 
claim based on parallel—even consciously parallel—conduct 
alone would be insufficient to survive dismissal, see Ins. 
Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 321, the Complaint provides more.  It 
alleges the type of agreement reached by the Blue Plans and 
the Association, an auditing mechanism by which the 
agreement is enforced, a particular time when a Blue Plan 
declined to cover telemetry monitors due to pressure from the 
Association and other Plans, and the improbability that the 
same coverage decision would be reached by nearly all the 
Blue Plans independently.7  The agreement and enforcement 
                                              
7 The Complaint also gestures at a motive to conspire when it 
describes the Defendants’ shared goal to save costs and 
increase profits by shifting demand to less expensive 
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mechanism pled here provide the “reasonably founded hope 
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; see also Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d 
at 324. 
B. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade 
To state a Section 1 claim, LifeWatch must also plead 
that Blue Cross’s agreement has unreasonably restrained 
trade.  See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 
(1998) (“[T]he Sherman Act’s prohibition of ‘[e]very’ 
agreement in ‘restraint of trade’ . . . prohibits only agreements 
that unreasonably restrain trade.” (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted)).  An “unreasonable” restraint is one that 
inhibits competition in the relevant market.  Eichorn v. AT & 
T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2001). 
A restraint among competitors—called “horizontal,” as 
opposed to “vertical” restraints on market participants at 
different points in a product’s supply chain—is more 
rigorously scrutinized for an antitrust violation because it 
could more easily facilitate competitive harms, such as the 
exclusion of rivals, price fixing, or the consolidation of 
market power.  See Areeda & Hovenkamp, Fundamentals, 
supra, § 14.11[A].  In particular, “when a firm exercises 
monopsony power pursuant to a conspiracy, its conduct is 
                                                                                                     
treatment options.  However, in our case law the mere desire 
to shift demand to lower cost devices is not a plus factor 
establishing an agreement without further evidence “of 
concerted, collusive conduct.”  Burtch, 662 F.3d at 229 
(quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 137 
(3d Cir. 1999)).  “In a free capitalistic society, all 
entrepreneurs have a legitimate understandable motive to 
increase profits.”  Id. (same). 
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subject to more rigorous scrutiny . . . .”  West Penn, 627 F.3d 
at 103.  “[U]nlike independent action, concerted activity 
inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk insofar as it 
deprives the marketplace of independent centers of 
decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, some horizontal 
restraints, including price fixing and market division, are 
considered anticompetitive by their very nature.  NYNEX 
Corp., 525 U.S. at 133-34 (citing United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (horizontal price-fixing), 
and Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) 
(per curiam) (horizontal market division)).  These are treated 
as per se Sherman Act Section 1 violations.  Id. 
However, many horizontal restraints are not so clearly 
harmful to competition.  Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, 
Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829-30 (3d Cir. 2010).  Instead, or in 
addition, they may, for example, facilitate the creation of new 
products, improve efficiencies, or lead to lower consumer 
costs.  A restraint that is not per se unreasonable is analyzed 
under some form8 of a “rule of reason” burden-shifting 
                                              
8 Some horizontal restraints may warrant only a “quick look,” 
rather than a complete rule-of-reason analysis.  See F.T.C. v. 
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); see also 
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018).  
A quick look “presum[es] competitive harm without detailed 
market analysis” because “the anticompetitive effects on 
markets and consumers are obvious.”  Deutscher Tennis 
Bund, 610 F.3d at 832.  It is inappropriate if “‘the contours of 
the market’ . . . are not ‘sufficiently well-known or defined to 
permit the court to ascertain without the aid of extensive 
market analysis whether the challenged practice impairs 
competition . . . .’”  Id. (quoting Worldwide Basketball & 
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framework, which seeks to determine whether the restraint’s 
harmful effects are outweighed by any procompetitive 
justifications and, if so, whether there are less restrictive 
alternatives.  Id.; see also United States v. Brown Univ., 5 
F.3d 658, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1993). 
LifeWatch claims the Blue Plans are engaged in a 
horizontal, concerted refusal to deal.  The parties agree that 
this conduct should be analyzed under the rule of reason 
framework.9  Thus LifeWatch can satisfy the unreasonable-
restraint element in two ways.  It can plead “‘actual 
detrimental effects [on competition],’ . . . such as reduced 
output, increased prices, or decreased quality in the relevant 
market.”  Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (quoting Ind. 
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460).  Alternatively, it can 
plead that the Blue Cross Defendants have “market power[,] 
plus some evidence that the challenged restraint harms 
competition.”  Id.  Under either approach, “courts usually 
cannot properly apply the rule of reason without an accurate 
definition of the relevant market” because, in most cases, a 
court must “conduct a fact-specific assessment of ‘market 
power and market structure . . . to assess the [restraint]’s 
                                                                                                     
Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 388 F.3d 
955, 961 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 
9 We note that some group boycotts, which are similar to 
concerted refusals to deal, are treated as unlawful per se.  Ind. 
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458.  But “the category of 
restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded 
indiscriminately, and the per se approach has generally been 
limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott 
suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from 
doing business with a competitor,” id., which LifeWatch does 
not allege here. 
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actual effect’ on competition.”  Id. at 2284-85 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 
467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)). 
The parties do not dispute that LifeWatch must allege 
a relevant market in this case.  We thus begin with those 
allegations, which provide the context for both its assertions 
of anticompetitive effects and the District Court’s rationale in 
granting Blue Cross’s motion to dismiss. 
1. Market Definition 
The relevant market in a Section 1 case is “the area of 
effective competition . . . within which significant substitution 
in consumption or production occurs.”  Am. Express Co., 138 
S. Ct. at 2285 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In other 
words, “the outer boundaries of a relevant market are 
determined by reasonable interchangeability of use” of a 
particular product within a particular geographic area.  Queen 
City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 437, 
442 (3d Cir. 1997).  In addition to substitutability or 
interchangeability, “[w]e also look to . . . cross-elasticity of 
demand, which is defined as ‘[a] relationship between two 
products, usually substitutes for each other, in which a price 
change for one product affects the price of the other.’”  Mylan 
Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 
435-36 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 458 
(10th ed. 2014)). 
Critically, in a buyer-side conspiracy case, seller rather 
than consumer or purchaser behavior is the focus.  Todd v. 
Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 2012 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, 
J.) (citing Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust 
Policy and Monopsony, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 297, 324 (1991)).  
“[The] market is comprised of buyers who are seen by sellers 
as being reasonably good substitutes.”  Campfield v. State 
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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Todd, 275 F.3d at 202).  Thus a court should 
be wary of applying the market-definition analysis for seller-
side conspiracies “mechanically in the context of monopsony 
or oligopsony.”  Todd, 275 F.3d at 202. 
A complaint may be properly dismissed if it defines 
the relevant market without reference to interchangeability or 
cross-elasticity of demand or if it “alleges a proposed relevant 
market that clearly does not encompass all interchangeable 
substitute products even when all factual inferences are 
granted in plaintiff’s favor . . . .”  Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d 
at 436.  However, absent such obvious oversights, courts are 
cautious before dismissing for failure to define a relevant 
market.  See Todd, 275 F.3d at 199-200 (collecting cases).  
Ultimately the relevant market must “both correspond to the 
commercial realities of the industry and be economically 
significant.”  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
336-37 (1962) (internal quotation omitted).  That is why, “in 
most cases, proper market definition can be determined only 
after a factual inquiry into the commercial realities faced by 
consumers” or purchasers, in seller-side conspiracies, or 
sellers, in buyer-side conspiracies.  Queen City Pizza, 124 
F.3d at 436; see also Todd, 275 F.3d at 199-200 (“Because 
market definition is a deeply fact-intensive inquiry, courts 
hesitate to grant motions to dismiss for failure to plead a 
relevant product market.”).  Our case deals with the latter: 
commercial realities faced by medical device sellers seeking 
purchases.  For example, these might be direct, out-of-pocket 
purchases by the end-user patients, patient purchases funded 
by a health insurer intermediary, or patient purchases 
reimbursed by a health insurer after the fact. 
A plaintiff bears the burden of defining both a relevant 
geographic and a relevant product market.  The Complaint 
asserts several relevant markets here: national and regional 
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markets for the sale of health insurance plans and a national 
market for the purchase of outpatient cardiac monitors.  
However, LifeWatch forfeited its insurance-market theories 
by not fully briefing them on appeal.  Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(8)(A); Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Panther Valley 
Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017).  When pressed 
during oral argument, it then explicitly waived them.  We 
therefore turn to the only market definition still before us: the 
national outpatient cardiac monitor market. 
The parties do not dispute that the alleged market is 
national, and the Complaint alleges commercial realities to 
support a nationwide market.  Patients nationwide suffer 
arrhythmias that may require treatment with cardiac monitors.  
Telemetry device firms and other unspecified monitoring-
device firms allegedly sell their products nationwide.  
Insurers on the buyer side that allegedly compensate sellers of 
cardiac monitors also operate nationally, including Medicaid 
and Medicare.  The Association’s model policy 
recommending that Blue Plans not pay for telemetry monitors 
is distributed nationally to each Blue Plan.  And, as noted, the 
Blue Plans operating across the country allegedly cover 105 
million Americans collectively, purportedly about half of all 
Americans with private insurance. 
However, the parties vigorously dispute whether 
LifeWatch has pled a relevant product market.  The focus of 
the parties’ briefing on appeal is whether telemetry monitors 
compete with other types of monitors.  According to 
LifeWatch, all outpatient cardiac monitor sellers compete 
within the same market.  The Complaint repeatedly references 
an “outpatient cardiac monitor” market and describes the four 
categories of monitors that compete within it: telemetry, 
Holter, event, and insertable monitors. 
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Although its opinion does not say so outright, the 
District Court seemingly rejected that market when it 
dismissed LifeWatch’s claim.  It reasoned that the Blue 
Plans’ alleged refusal to purchase telemetry monitors had no 
anticompetitive effects among telemetry monitor providers 
because it treated them all equally.  See LifeWatch Servs., 248 
F. Supp. 3d at 649.  Blue Cross argues the District Court 
implicitly, and correctly, held that LifeWatch’s claimed 
product market was implausible and therefore adopted a 
telemetry-monitor-only market for purposes of its 
anticompetitive-effects analysis. 
Read in the light most favorable to LifeWatch, 
however, the Complaint alleges competition among all 
outpatient cardiac monitors such that they are plausibly 
within the same product market.  All four of the alleged 
categories of monitors capture the same type of data from a 
patient’s heart.  They capture it for the same purpose: to 
identify and treat cardiac arrhythmias.  The principal harm 
LifeWatch alleges is that Blue Cross is shifting demand to 
other outpatient cardiac monitors—presumably conduct that 
would be impossible if the monitors were not interchangeable 
to some relevant degree.  Indeed, LifeWatch claims many 
doctors have given up prescribing telemetry monitors and 
instead rely exclusively on other cardiac monitors to treat 
their patients.  The Complaint also quotes a medical study by 
the American Heart Association recommending telemetry 
monitors alongside other cardiac monitors to treat certain 
conditions. 
Undoubtedly the Complaint alleges that certain 
monitors are less able to function in some areas than others, 
while others are costlier.  It describes telemetry monitors as 
superior to Holter and event monitors in their ease of use, 
greater data capture, and ability to diagnose infrequent or 
incapacitating arrhythmias.  It asserts that only telemetry 
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monitors ought to be prescribed for patients with certain 
conditions. 
Blue Cross argues these allegations are fatal to 
LifeWatch’s claim because they establish that telemetry 
monitors are not reasonably interchangeable with other 
cardiac monitors.  But differentiation is often present among 
competing products in the same market.  For example, as we 
have long observed, different brands of cars may compete to 
provide a consumer’s main transportation to and from work—
and, depending on the circumstances, they may also compete 
with other modes of travel.  Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 
437.  “Many machines performing the same function—such 
as copiers, computers, or automobiles—differ not only in 
brand name but also in performance, physical appearance, 
size, capacity, cost, price, reliability, ease of use, service, 
customer support, and other features.”   Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, Fundamentals, supra, § 5.11[A].  “Nevertheless, 
they generally compete with one another sufficiently that the 
price of one brand is greatly constrained by the price of 
others.”  Id. 
Beyond the question of competition among cardiac 
monitors, however, there is apparently a more fundamental 
problem with the District Court’s reasoning and Blue Cross’s 
arguments on appeal.  The underlying question driving the 
unreasonable-restraint analysis in a buyer-side conspiracy 
case is whether the defendants’ purchasing power is 
constrained by competition from other purchasers in the 
relevant market.  Thus, from the perspective of a seller, the 
interchangeability that matters is for purchasers of outpatient 
cardiac monitors. 
Once again, as LifeWatch argues, the Complaint 
alleges sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss.  It 
notes that sellers of medical devices like LifeWatch “are often 
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small and highly dependent on a limited number of products,” 
suggesting they cannot easily change their products or expand 
their offerings to induce a disinterested buyer to purchase 
from them.10  Third Am. Compl. ¶ 63.  It also plausibly 
alleges that health insurers are gatekeepers controlling patient 
purchases in the market.  According to the Complaint, it is 
exceedingly rare for a patient to pay for a medical device out 
of pocket.  It describes in detail the difficulties patients face 
in obtaining outpatient cardiac monitors not covered by their 
insurers, including the opaque, costly appeals process for 
coverage denials and that patients are often locked into 
whatever health plan their employer sponsors.  Thus it is fair 
to infer that individual consumers do not constrain the Blue 
Plans’ ability to control purchases or purchase prices.  The 
Complaint acknowledges that other insurers like Aetna, 
Medicaid, and Medicare also fund patient purchases of 
outpatient cardiac monitors.  It also describes the 
prohibitively high entry barriers to the health insurance 
business.  According to these allegations, only established 
insurers effectively control purchases of outpatient cardiac 
monitors. 
                                              
10 We note that LifeWatch allegedly began offering a lower-
priced “Elite” monitor after Highmark’s decision to stop 
covering telemetry monitors in part.  However, the Complaint 
suggests that the Elite product still costs LifeWatch the same 
amount to make and that it operates at less-than-optimal 
performance, as it is a standard telemetry monitor with some 
functions either not provided or disabled.  LifeWatch’s Elite 
monitor allegations illustrate that medical device sellers may 
not be able to change their inventories readily in response to 
changing buyer preferences.  No allegations support a 
contrary inference. 
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In this context, we conclude the Complaint plausibly 
states that the Blue Plans compete with other insurers, but not 
individual consumers, in a national market for the purchase of 
outpatient cardiac monitors. 
2. Anticompetitive Effects 
Armed with the proper market definition, the 
unreasonable-restraint analysis becomes straightforward.  The 
Complaint alleges various “actual anticompetitive effects,” 
which, as noted, could include “reduction of output, increase 
in price, or deterioration in quality of goods and services.”  
Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Virtua Health, Inc., 833 F.3d 
399, 403 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Angelico v. Lehigh Valley 
Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 276 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
According to the Complaint, the Blue Plans refuse to 
pay for telemetry monitors “not as a result of independent 
decisionmaking, but pursuant to a conspiracy” with each 
other and the Association.  See West Penn, 627 F.3d at 104.  
We have held in similar cases that it is “certainly plausible” 
for this sort of agreement to “unreasonably restrain[] trade.”  
Id.  “Such shortchanging poses competitive threats similar to 
those posed by conspiracies among buyers to fix prices . . . 
and other restraints that result in artificially depressed 
payments to suppliers—namely, suboptimal output, reduced 
quality, allocative inefficiencies, and (given the reductions in 
output) higher prices for consumers in the long run.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
Indeed, these are the anticompetitive effects LifeWatch 
claims.  According to the Complaint, Blue Cross’s concerted 
denial of telemetry monitor coverage has harmed consumers 
by reducing demand for and output of more effective devices, 
by interfering with a patient’s choice of medical treatment, 
and by reducing the quality of cardiac monitors in general.  
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LifeWatch alleges the restraint artificially shifts demand from 
telemetry monitors to lower quality substitutes.  It 
discourages physicians and their patients from choosing the 
most appropriate treatment.  Further, physicians, who 
typically do not know which insurance a patient has, are 
allegedly deterred from prescribing telemetry monitors 
altogether, even if it is the preferred treatment for patients 
whose insurance would cover it.  They simply prescribe a 
cardiac monitor that will certainly be covered, rather than risk 
discovering later that the patient cannot afford a telemetry 
monitor.  And because the restraint reduces current and 
anticipated demand for telemetry monitors in favor of older 
technology, it hinders research, development, and innovation 
in the market for cardiac monitors. 
The District Court’s reasoning that there can be no 
anticompetitive effects from a restraint that treats all sellers of 
telemetry monitors equally rests on a telemetry-monitor-only 
product market that was not alleged.  A concerted refusal to 
deal with all sellers of telemetry monitors, regardless of its 
equality, may still restrain competition in the alleged market 
for the purchase of outpatient cardiac monitors. 
The District Court also attempted to distinguish this 
case from Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 
(1982).  But with our understanding of the alleged product 
market, those distinctions disappear.  In McCready, a plaintiff 
patient denied coverage for psychological treatment brought a 
class action against Blue Shield health insurance companies 
and a group of psychiatrists for allegedly agreeing “to exclude 
and boycott clinical psychologists from receiving 
compensation under the Blue Shield plans.”  457 U.S. at 470.  
In analyzing whether the patient’s injury was of a type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent, the Supreme Court 
described the alleged agreement as an “anticompetitive 
scheme.”  Id. at 483.  “Blue Shield sought to induce its 
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subscribers into selecting psychiatrists over psychologists” by 
“refusing to reimburse subscribers for psychotherapy 
performed by psychologists, while providing reimbursement 
for comparable treatment by psychiatrists.”  Id. at 467, 483-
84.  A subscriber presented with this alleged “Hobson’s 
choice . . . between visiting a psychologist and forfeiting 
reimbursement, or receiving reimbursement by forgoing 
treatment by the practitioner of their choice” was injured by 
“that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful”—i.e., by 
their anticompetitive effects.  Id. at 484. 
Similarly, LifeWatch claims that the Blue Plans induce 
doctors and insureds to use other outpatient cardiac monitors 
instead of telemetry monitors by refusing to fund telemetry 
monitor prescriptions while funding comparable treatment 
with other monitors.  See id. at 483-84.  The District Court 
suggested there can be no “Hobson’s choice” as in McCready 
where the Blue plans “do not cover any telemetry device 
supplied by any provider.”  LifeWatch Servs., 248 F. Supp. 3d 
at 648.  But the “Hobson’s choice” here is not among 
telemetry monitor brands but among all cardiac monitors—
just as in McCready the choice was not among psychologists 
but among all psychotherapy providers. 
Because LifeWatch has alleged actual anticompetitive 
effects in the relevant market, the unreasonable restraint 
element of the Section 1 claim is satisfied directly.  We thus 
need not consider whether LifeWatch also satisfied it 
indirectly by alleging Blue Cross’s market power over the 
purchase of outpatient cardiac monitors.  See Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. 
C. Antitrust Standing 
In the preceding analysis we concluded that LifeWatch 
pled a Section 1 violation.  However, its claim could 
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nonetheless fail if it lacks antitrust standing to bring suit 
under the Clayton Act. 
Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act enable private 
plaintiffs to sue for treble damages for and to enjoin antitrust 
injuries.  15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.  While the statutory language 
of those provisions is broad, and apparently requires only 
constitutional standing to bring suit,11 the Supreme Court has 
held that private plaintiffs must also have “antitrust standing.”  
See Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 
806 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir. 2015).  The Court articulated 
several factors to consider when analyzing whether a plaintiff 
has such standing.  Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. 
v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 
(1983).  We have summarized these factors as:  
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the 
intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 
neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) 
whether the plaintiff's alleged injury is of the 
type for which the antitrust laws were intended 
                                              
11 Standing is a term for “[a] party’s right to make a legal 
claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 1625 (10th ed. 2014).  Constitutional 
standing derives from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 
which limits the federal court’s “judicial power,” or 
jurisdiction, to deciding “cases” or “controversies.”  U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 
1540, 1547 (2016).  For a federal court to have jurisdiction 
over any claim, “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an 
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable judicial decision.”  Id. at 1547. 
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to provide redress; (3) the directness of the 
injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
application of standing principles might 
produce speculative claims; (4) the existence of 
more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 
violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment of 
damages. 
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 
1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993). 
The parties here dispute only whether LifeWatch 
alleged the second factor, antitrust injury, which “is a 
necessary but insufficient condition of antitrust standing.”  
Hanover 3201 Realty, 806 F.3d at 171.  It seeks to ensure that 
the antitrust laws are enforced to protect competition and not 
individual competitors.  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).  An antitrust injury (1) 
“flows from that which makes [the] defendants’ acts 
unlawful” and (2) “is an injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent.”  West Penn, 627 F.3d at 101 
(quoting Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489). 
To analyze the first prong of antitrust injury, “we must 
examine the causal connection between the purportedly 
unlawful conduct and the injury.”  City of Pittsburgh v. W. 
Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1998).  Blue 
Cross argues that intervening factors, such as the Plan’s 
independent ability to decline coverage of telemetry monitors, 
a doctor’s choice not to prescribe telemetry monitors, and a 
patient’s desire for alternative treatments, “‘cut[] the causal 
chain’ and convert any claim of causation into ‘a speculative 
exercise.’”  Appellee Br. 32 (quoting City of Pittsburgh, 147 
F.3d at 267-68). 
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We find this causation argument unpersuasive.  The 
Complaint asserts that the Plans’ near universal decision to 
deny coverage of telemetry monitors would not occur without 
enforcement of the Uniformity Rule—as evidenced by other 
insurers’ coverage, independent arbitrators’ decisions that 
they should be covered, and scientific studies finding them 
effective and in some circumstances preferable.  It also 
alleges that doctors are deterred from prescribing telemetry 
monitors because of the Blue Plans’ decision not to cover 
them and the hassle caused by not knowing whether a 
patient’s insurer will deny coverage.  And it alleges that the 
Uniformity Rule insulates the Plans from demand for 
telemetry treatment.  This sufficiently pleads a causal link 
between LifeWatch’s injury—lost profits from depressed 
telemetry monitor sales—and the Plans’ denial of telemetry 
monitor coverage due to the Uniformity Rule.  See 
McCready, 457 U.S. at 480-81, 483 (noting providers, in 
addition to consumers, of a medical treatment would have a 
claim for “Blue Shield’s selective refusal to reimburse” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. City of Pittsburgh, 
147 F.3d 267 (finding no causal link where plaintiff’s injury 
was due to regulations preventing competition between 
defendant utility companies, not the defendants’ proposed 
merger). 
Likewise, LifeWatch’s alleged injury due to 
anticompetitive effects in the outpatient cardiac monitor 
market is “of the type” the antitrust laws were meant to 
prevent.  “As a general matter, the class of plaintiffs capable 
of satisfying the antitrust-injury requirement is limited to 
consumers and competitors in the restrained market . . . and to 
those whose injuries are the means by which the defendants 
seek to achieve their anticompetitive ends.”  West Penn, 627 
F.3d at 102 (internal citations omitted).  Denying coverage for 
LifeWatch’s telemetry device was the means by which the 
Blue Plans and the Association depressed demand for 
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telemetry monitors in the outpatient cardiac monitor market.  
Its ability to compete as a seller of outpatient cardiac 
monitors has been allegedly hindered by the Uniformity Rule.  
See McCready, 457 U.S. at 483-84 (noting where insureds 
“were compelled to choose” between a covered treatment 
provider and one for whom Blue Shield denied coverage, the 
denied treatment provider also had antitrust injury).  Its injury 
“reflect[s] the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or 
of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.”  West 
Penn, 627 F.3d at 101 (quoting Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 
489).   
Blue Cross counters that no competition-reducing 
conduct was alleged because all telemetry monitor providers 
are treated equally; therefore LifeWatch’s injury is not “of the 
type” the antitrust laws seek to prevent.  Of course, this only 
reiterates the District Court’s implicit product market analysis 
with which we have already disagreed. 
In sum, LifeWatch sufficiently pled both elements of 
antitrust injury, and its antitrust standing is not otherwise in 
dispute. 
D. McCarran-Ferguson Act 
Finally, LifeWatch’s claim can only survive Blue 
Cross’s motion to dismiss if the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, does not exempt Blue Cross from 
antitrust liability.  As Blue Cross acknowledged at oral 
argument, a defendant bears the burden of establishing its 
immunity under that Act.  See Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of 
Greater Phila., 490 F.2d 48, 50 n.2 (3d Cir. 1973) (“The 
motions to dismiss were filed before either defendant 
submitted an answer.  As a result, the essential facts 
necessary to support this claim of immunity have not as yet 
been pleaded.”); Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug 
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Co., 440 U.S. 205, 216 (1979) (analyzing the Act’s 
exemption according to what the defendants demonstrated). 
On the heels of a Supreme Court ruling that “insurance 
transactions were subject to federal regulation under the 
Commerce Clause, and that the antitrust laws in particular, 
were applicable to them,” Congress passed the McCarran-
Ferguson Act to clarify that regulation of the “business of 
insurance” should be relegated to the states.  Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1969).  
However, the Act provides that the Sherman Act still applies 
to “the business of insurance to the extent that such business 
is not regulated by State Law” and to “agreement[s] to 
boycott, coerce, or intimidate.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 
1013(b).  Therefore, for Blue Cross to be exempted from 
liability in this case, its challenged conduct “(1) must 
constitute the business of insurance, (2) must be regulated by 
state law, and (3) must not amount to a boycott, coercion, or 
intimidation.”  Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 
119, 124 (1982).  The parties agree that Blue Cross has 
satisfied the third element but dispute whether it can satisfy 
the first two. 
Because it dismissed on other grounds, the District 
Court did not address whether Blue Cross has shown it is 
exempt.  We do not decide the issue and leave it for the 
Court’s consideration on remand. 
III. Conclusion 
LifeWatch plausibly pled an agreement between the 
Blue Plans and the Association that unreasonably restrains 
trade in the national market for outpatient cardiac monitors.  
It pled that its injury stems from the competitive harms 
caused by this agreement.  Thus LifeWatch has stated a 
Sherman Act Section 1 claim. 
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Blue Cross nonetheless may be exempt from liability 
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a question the District 
Court did not reach in its opinion.  We therefore reverse its 
dismissal and remand for it to consider Blue Cross’s 
McCarran-Ferguson Act argument. 
